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Growth and Volatility of Tax Revenues 





Against the background of a notoriously high macroeconomic instability and the need to raise 
tax revenues to meet the demands of public spending, this paper analyzes the tradeoff 
between growth and volatility of tax revenues in Latin America. We use a two-step Engle-
Granger-type model to estimate short-run and long-run elasticities, accounting for state-
dependent asymmetric reactions of short-run elasticities over the business cycle. Due to its 
dependence on commodities exploitation Latin America is in general susceptible to the boom-
bust cycles of its natural riches. Controlling for the composition of revenue sources and other 
idiosyncrasies of Latin American economies, we find revenues above (below) its long-run 
equilibrium to react stronger (weaker) to business cycle dynamics. This “tax revenue channel” 
represents an indirect argument for counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy in the region. 
Our detailed elasticity estimates can give some orientation on how to reach necessary higher 
tax levels without creating disincentives and inequities through business cycle instabilities on 
the way to develop an adequate internal tax system. 
JEL-Code: H200, O100, E600. 
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1. Introduction 
In general, collecting taxes is justified by the generation of revenue to finance public 
goods and services like education, health and other social programs. Providing these 
prerequisites for economic performance is crucial, especially in developing econo-
mies, to foster growth and to reduce inequality and poverty. Given a notoriously high 
macroeconomic instability of Latin American economies (Catão 2007) and resultant 
capital market constraints tax revenues need to be both stable and growing in order to 
meet these prerequisites. This need is all the more obvious given the fact that Latin 
American economies generally are dependent on the shackles of commodities exploi-
tation, which provides the livelihoods of their citizens but leaves their economies per-
ennially susceptible to boom-bust cycles and currency fluctuations. 
As state governments in the U.S. are also constrained in their external financing 
and habitually tend to suffer from cyclical budget contractions, the vast majority of 
the existing literature on tax revenue growth and volatility is concerned with U.S. fed-
eral states. It dates back to the seminal study by Groves and Kahn (1952). Early stud-
ies that followed (e.g., Wilford 1965, Legler and Shapiro 1968) analyzed state and 
local tax revenue, conditioning revenues on income using standard OLS and not dis-
tinguishing between the long and short run. By the early 1970s, Williams et al. (1973) 
demonstrated that two taxes can follow the same growth trend while experiencing a 
distinct variability around it. Their findings suggest that a single statistic for revenue 
elasticity can not be used to analyze growth and variability at the same time and that a 
possible  trade-off  between  growth  and  stability  exists.  The  succeeding  studies  by 
White (1983) and Fox and Campbell (1984), therefore, considered different taxes and 
tax structures, confirming this trade-off and finding personal income tax (PIT) and 
corporate income tax (CIT) to be the fastest growing but also the most unstable taxes. 
While,  for  example,  White  (1983)  restricted  his  analysis  to  one  state,  Dye  and 
McGuire (1991) applied White’s methodology to all federal states. Sobel and Hol-
combe (1996) further improved this methodology by accounting for problems of re-
sidual variability, serial correlation, and non-stationarity of revenue series. The latest 
development in this row is Bruce et al. (2006) who combine the structured approach 
of Fox and Campbell (1984) with the refined methodology proposed by Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996). For our estimates, we will widely adhere to their approach. 
To the best of our knowledge, these latest techniques by now have —besides for 
U.S. federal states— only been used to study a few other countries; see Wolswijk 
(2009) for the Netherlands and Acquaah and Gelardi (2008) for British Colombian 
revenues. 
Although some tax revenue elasticity estimates for Latin American economies 
can be found in the literature (usually intended to calculate cyclically adjusted bal-  2 
ances), the evidence remains scattered across the different nations and mostly stems 
from  researchers  located  in  governmental  organizations  in  the  region  (e.g.,  Basso 
2006, Cárdenas et al. 2008, De Mello and Moccero 2006, Rincón et al. 2003, Salazar 
and Prada 2003, Schenone and De la Torre 2005, Tapia 2003). With few exceptions 
(Antelo 2003, Fuentes and Tobar 2003) this literature is focused on a long-run rela-
tionship, i.e., the growth aspect of tax revenues. Neither is the issue of growth and 
stability of revenues analyzed jointly nor is a potential trade-off examined. 
The present study contributes to the literature by applying the latest techniques 
to estimate short-run and long-run elasticities of tax revenues in Latin America, ac-
counting for asymmetric reactions of short-run elasticities over the business cycle. 
Considering the composition of revenues of personal and corporate income tax (PIT, 
CIT), value added tax (VAT), social security contributions, and revenues from com-
modities exploitation, we find revenues above (below) its long-run equilibrium to re-
act stronger (weaker) to business cycle dynamics. Our detailed elasticity estimates can 
give some orientation on how to reach necessary higher tax levels without creating 
disincentives and inequities through business cycle instabilities on the way to develop 
an adequate internal tax system. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the re-
cent development of tax collection in Latin American economies. Section 3 gives an 
outline of the data and methodology we use. In Section 4 we present and discuss our 
findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Some recent development in tax collection across Latin America 
Throughout Latin America the tax burden has been relatively low. In 2008, central 
governments  on  average  collected  only  17.9%  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP).
1 
Even though this amount is a considerable increase over the 12.5% collected in 1990, 
it remains well under revenues collected in developed countries: The OECD reports a 
corresponding 35.2% on average in 2008.
2 Similarly, Tanzi and Zee (2000) and Bahl 
and Bird (2006) document a level of taxation in industrialized countries by the end of 
the 20
th century that was about twice that in developing countries. Historically, this 
rather small amount of tax revenues proved insufficient to meet the demands of public 
spending in the region. Only in 2006 and 2007 did revenues exceed spending, making 
                                                 
1 As can be seen from the figures reported in Tanzi and Zee (2000, p. 303), this average level of tax 
revenue for all developing countries in the Western Hemisphere taken together has been fairly stable, 
lying between 17.6-18%, for approximately the second half of the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. 
 
2 Within the region the tax burden is rather heterogeneous. While Brazil and Argentina collect more 
than 30% of GDP, Mexico and Haiti do not reach 10% in 2008. For the vast majority, however, the 
respective share lies between 10 and 20%.   3 
it  look  like  governments  are  now  more  “fiscally  conservative”  and  suggesting 
“strongly that on the whole this is a good thing for their people;” see Bahl and Bird 
(2008, p. 295). This period, however, came to a sudden end in 2008 when the inter-
tional financial crisis began to hit the region. 
Besides comparably low levels of taxation, macroeconomic volatility in Latin 
America has been higher than in developed countries and in emerging economies in 
Asia  and  East  Europe  (Catão  2007).  Fluctuations  in  macroeconomic  activity  have 
caused major losses in tax revenues. The recent crisis has demonstrated how vulner-
able these revenues are to contractions in economic activity (Figure 1). As shown in 
Figure 1, tax revenues sharply fell at the end of 2008 and during 2009. For example, 
in the second quarter of 2009 Chilean revenues decreased by as much as 34.6% in 
comparison to the previous year. While this drop was not as pronounced as in other 
countries, it was still severe.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Tax Collection during the Recent Crisis
 a) 




Source: ECLAC (2008) 
a)  Without social security contributions 
 
The interplay between structurally low tax burden and temporary busts in tax reve-
nues has forced several governments in the region to cut down on public services and 
fall back on external financing in unfavorable conditions. The margin for counter-
cyclical policies narrowed for some countries (ECLAC 2008, Fanelli 2009). A tax 
structure with positive revenue growth is not sufficient to ensure solvency each year. 
Transitory fluctuations can lead to resource shortages even though tax revenues grow 
in the long run, rendering accurate year-to-year budget planning a most difficult task. 
Among other factors such as poor tax administration (cf. Bahl and Bird 2008) this   4 
makes tax policy in developing countries in general “the art of the possible rather than 
the pursuit of the optimal” (Tanzi and Zee 2000, p. 300). 
Under the presumption that the Latin American economies seek to become fully 
integrated with the world economy like countries such as Canada and Australia that 
were seen as “regions of recent settlement” a century ago and succeeded in installing 
an adequate internal tax system (Bahl and Bird 2008, p. 279) they will as Tanzi and 
Zee (2000, p. 320) put it in the long run “probably need a higher tax level, because of 
the need to pursue a government role closer to that of industrial countries.” Long-run 
elasticity estimates capture tax revenue growth, as they measure the relationship be-
tween the cumulative development of tax revenues and aggregate income or the re-
spective commodity price for the total period of observation. Short-run elasticity es-
timates give an answer to the question of how revenues respond to the ups and downs 
of the business cycle or of commodity prices. In this sense, they capture the volatility 
of revenues. However, there might be a trade-off, inasmuch as faster growing tax 
revenue sources might react more strongly to macroeconomic fluctuations and, thus, 
prove to be less stable. If this is the case, policy makers face the problem of finding a 
balance between policy goals of revenue expansion and maintaining revenue stability. 
 
Figure 2: Major Tax Revenue Sources in Latin America 
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Source: own calculations based on ECLAC (2008) 
a) Average for social security contributions does not include Haiti. 
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Our analysis will focus on major sources of revenues in Latin America: VAT, 
income  tax  (IT),  social  security  contributions,  and  revenue  from  commodities.  In 
2008, IT, VAT, and social security contributions make up 76.8% of total tax revenues. 
As shown in Figure 2, VAT is the fastest growing tax. IT revenue grows more moder-
ately over the last two decades. Social security contributions have decreased slightly 
from 16.6% to 14.8% with a minor increase in the first half of the 1990s. It is note-
worthy, however, that there are considerable differences in the composition of these 
revenue sources across countries in the region. For example, in Bolivia VAT accounts 
for 46.2% of total tax revenues in 2008, while in Panama it amounts to only 13.8%. 
Going further into detail, we differentiate (i) personal income tax (PIT) from 
corporate income tax (CIT) and (ii) external VAT from domestic VAT. Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 show the sample variation of PIT and CIT as well as the one of the two VAT 
components  for  the  Peruvian  economy  during  the  financial  crisis.  Obviously,  PIT 
revenue growth slowed gradually until revenue fell slightly in the second quarter of 
2009 and only recovered slowly afterwards. Ups and downs of CIT revenues are more 
pronounced and somewhat lag the cycle. In fact, CIT revenue growth actually accel-
erated at the end of 2008 before falling in 2009. Possible explanations for the differ-
ences include the fact that wages are usually more stable in the short-run due to labor 
market frictions, while companies face a profound negative impact on profits during a 
trough. 
In  the  case  of  domestic  and  external  VAT  the  difference  is  even  more  pro-
nounced. While domestic VAT revenue is only slightly affected by the drop in eco-
nomic activity, external VAT revenue grew much faster during 2008 but fell by as 
much as 34.9% in the third quarter of 2009. Imports in the region mainly consist of 
durable  (and  luxury)  goods,  while  domestic  production  satisfies  basic  consumer 
needs, which are generally less elastic. Therefore, a contraction of national income 
will likely be reflected in a decreased demand for imported goods and, consequently, 
a drop in revenue from taxes levied on imports. In the Peruvian case, domestic VAT 
(PIT) seems to react less to changes in economic activity than external VAT (CIT). 
As argued above, a peculiarity of most Latin American economies lies in their 
dependence  on  commodities  exploitation.  In  Venezuela,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Mexico
3 non-renewable commodities and natural resources account for 
over 20% of exports. Considering exports of renewable commodities, the list also in-
cludes  Argentina  as  well  as  several  other  countries  in  Central  America.  In  these 
economies, tax revenues and non-tax revenues from these sectors generate a sizable 
                                                 
3 For simplicity reasons, we will refer to the Plurinational State of Bolivia as Bolivia and to the Boli-
varian Republic of Venezuela as Venezuela. 
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share of total fiscal revenue. During 2008, shares of revenue from commodities in to-
tal revenue ranged from 11.3% in Peru to 49.6% in Venezuela. 
 
Figure 3: Variation of PIT and CIT in Peru 







I II III IV I II III IV
2008 2009
Personal Income Tax Corporate Income Tax
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 4: Variation of Domestic and External VAT in Peru  
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Source: own calculations 
 
As commodity sectors mainly produce for exports, revenues are crucially de-
pendent on the price of the commodities in question. Moreover, tax and non-tax reve-
nue are usually linked to the performance of the sector and as a result depend on the 
commodity’s price.
4 Jiménez and Tromben (2006) find that revenues from commodi-
ties, in general, show a higher standard deviation than non-commodity revenue series. 
For this reason, we will analyze revenue from commodities and non-commodity reve-
nue separately: the first with respect to the particular commodity price and the latter 
                                                 
4 Jiménez and Tromben (2006) give an overview of tax regimes for non-renewables.   7 
with respect to GDP as a measure for aggregate income. The existing literature is fo-
cused on measuring the long-run responses of tax revenues, whereas the short-run has 
been widely neglected. Most of the estimates stem from cyclical adjusted balances 
(CAB) and thus are not estimated to explicitly analyze growth or volatility. Existing 
studies so far also have concentrated either solely on one country or, if they consid-
ered several countries, on total tax revenues only. The present study will be the first to 
estimate long-run and short-run elasticities of the most important tax revenue sources 
for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
In principle there are two options when quantifying the responsiveness of taxation to 
changes in national income: either to use tax base (cf. Dye and McGuire 1991, Sobel 
and Holcombe 1996, Nichols and Tosun 2008) or tax revenue (cf. Bruce et al. 2006, 
Acquaah and Gelardi 2008, Felix 2008) data. If the relationship between the two is 
proportional then tax base and tax revenue elasticities would be equivalent. However, 
due to progressivity of the tax schedule, tax exemptions, or tax evasion, there usually 
is no such equivalence. In practice, both approaches have advantages and disadvan-
tages. Estimates of tax revenue elasticities can be biased if tax code changes altering 
the definition of tax base or tax rates are not controlled for in the empirical model’s 
specification.
5 Tax base based estimates do not suffer from this bias. Tax base data, 
however, is in general not readily available and has to be hypothetically constructed 
with the help of proxies (Dye and McGuire 1991, Sobel and Holcombe 1996), which 
do not necessarily coincide with the legal tax base definition (Dye 2004). In fact, we 
know only about one study, Nichols and Tosun (2008), where the authors use exact 
tax base data by analyzing gambling taxes, for which gross casino revenues represent 
the actual tax base. 
Due to data limitations and for the sake of comparability, we follow the recent 
studies of Bruce et al. (2006), Acquaah and Gelardi (2008), and Felix (2008) by rely-
ing on tax revenue data and by controlling for policy changes like tax rate or tax base 
changes (Appendix B) in our empirical model. As not for all Latin American econo-
mies disaggregate data on revenues is available, we have to limit our analysis in these 
                                                                                                                                            
 
5 In this context, the literature distinguishes between tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. Tax buoyancy 
measures the total response of tax revenues including discretionary policy, that is, the response if tax 
code changes are not controlled for in the empirical model. Tax elasticity, in contrast, isolates built-in 
responsiveness to changes in national income. 
   8 
cases to aggregate data on IT and VAT. Our series are of quarterly frequency and 
range for most of the series from the first quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 2009. 
To deflate the revenue series we employ a corresponding GDP deflator. If the latter is 
not available, we resort to the respective CPI. To express commodity prices in real 
terms, we use the U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI).
6 All series were deseasonalized 
applying the standard ARIMA X-12 method. Detail along with data sources is given 
in Appendix A. 
With regard to revenues from commodities we consider tax as well as non-tax 
revenues. Non-tax revenues from commodities, such as transfers, are usually linked to 
sector performance. The latter rather depends on commodity prices than on economic 
activity.  As  a  result,  we  expect  non-tax  revenues  from  commodities  to  react  to 
changes in the commodity price. In the case of Peru and Argentina, revenue from 
commodities is, in contrast to the other economies in the region, not primarily raised 
from a single good. We, therefore, construct Peruvian and Argentinean price indices 
as weighted averages of prices for commodities with a substantial share in exports.
7 
Argentinean taxes on basic goods exports are considered commodity revenues rather 
than taxes. As each product is taxed with a different rate, an approximation of the 




Following the method proposed in Sobel and Holcombe (1996), we estimate long-run 
elasticities relying on dynamic OLS (DOLS) techniques (Stock and Watson 1993). A 
standard error correction model (ECM) is used to estimate short-run elasticities (Engle 
and Granger 1987). Additionally, we allow short-run elasticities to vary for different 
states of economic conditions. Following Bruce et al. (2006), state-dependent asym-
metry is taken into account according to the position of actual revenue to respective 
long-run value. Tax revenue measures and cyclical variables are analyzed in natural 
log expression. To control for changes in legislation, tax rates are included in the em-
pirical models as independents. They capture variations in the schedule and have been 
considered for IT (PIT, CIT) and VAT (domestic VAT, external VAT) series. Other 
changes in the tax code like changes in the definition of legal tax bases are controlled 
                                                 
6 Note, the standard measure to deflate commodity prices is the Manufactures Unit Value Index (MUV) 
provided by the IMF or the Worldbank (e.g., Cashin et al. 2000). However, for the period under con-
sideration it has not been constructed in quarterly or monthly form. Labys (2006) suggests the PPI pro-
vided by the U.S. Department of Commerce as an alternative due to the fact that it shows a high corre-
lation as well as structural and behavioral similarities with the Worldbank’s MUV. 
 
7 For Peru, the price index is computed on the base of prices for copper, gold, zinc, and crude petro-
leum. Each price is weighted according to its share in the export volume of these four goods. For Ar-
gentina, the price index we used is based on the prices of beef, soybeans, soybean oil, and crude petro-
leum.   9 
for by use of dummy variables. 
As we presume the existence of a long-run equilibrium in order to quantify the 
long-run relationship between revenue and macroeconomic conditions, the two vari-
ables must be cointegrated and trending together, in the sense of following a common 
stochastic trend. This implies that for the two non-stationary series a linear combina-
tion exists that is I(0). To assess these technical conditions, we conduct standard ADF 
and PP tests for the series in levels, first differences, and for the residuals from re-
gressing revenue on cyclical variable, respectively. Several of the revenue series are 
found to be trend stationary, while the vast majority of cyclical variables is found to 
be stationary in first differences (detailed ADF and PP test results are available on re-
quest).
8 Thus, we decided to follow a two-track strategy. First, we interpret these test 
results as being the product of small sample bias and notoriously low power of unit 
root tests and treat the trend stationary series as sharing a stochastic trend with the 
business cycle. This part of our strategy corresponds for example to the approach fol-
lowed by Wolswijk (2009). 
Additionally, we also considered another strategy for series tested to be trend 
stationary by estimating a deterministic trend instead of a long-run multiplier in the 
first step of our analysis (White 1983). It measures, how much tax revenue grows 
each period without considering a relation to a particular macroeconomic base. In a 
second step, symmetric short-run elasticities are estimated using standard OLS in dif-
ferences without including an error correction term. In the final step, asymmetric reac-
tions are taken into account by allowing short-run elasticities to vary according to the 
position of current revenue relative to deterministic trend. Using White’s approach, 
we estimate 35 long-run and 19 short-run elasticities across countries and taxes as be-
ing statistically different from zero. Do these estimates substantially differ from the 
results we would have obtained by treating the trend stationary tested series as sharing 
a stochastic trend with the business cycle (cf. Wolswijk 2009) and applying the meth-
ods proposed by Bruce et al. (2006) to estimate elasticities? Figure 5 gives the answer 
by plotting these estimates on the ordinate against the ones that we obtain by adhering 
to the method of Bruce et al. (2006) on the abscissa. 
If we center the elasticity estimates obtained from the respective method and re-
gress them on each other, we find the correlation coefficient for the long-run elasticity 
estimates to amount to 0.53, the one for short-run elasticities to 0.94, and the one for 
all elasticities to 0.64. Throughout, these correlations are significant at all conven-
tional levels of significance. This finding leads us to abstract in the following from 
discussing estimates resultant from the method proposed by White (1983). Detailed 
                                                 
8 Due to the fact that we are after pecularities and national idiosyncrasies in the relationship between 
revenues and cyclical variables and, hence, do not treat the series in an unbalanced panel framework, it 
hardly makes sense to resort to more powerful panel unit root tests such as Maddala and Wu (1999).   10 
estimates based on White’s approach for all trend stationary tested series are available 
on request from the authors. Therefore, in what follows, we report results obtained 
from the method of Bruce et al. (2006) throughout. 
 
Figure 5: Elasticity estimates: White’s method (ordinate) vs. Bruce et al.’s method (abscissa) 
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Notes: Shown estimates are statistically significant estimates for which p ≤ 0.1; pooled over all considered economies and taxes. 
In fact, White-results represent quasi-elasticities measuring a certain percentage that respective revenues grow each period. 
 
In our baseline regressions, the DOLS-model is used to estimate the long-term 
elasticity  1 β  from single equation cointegration relationships of the following form 
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where T
i denotes revenues from tax i and Y real GDP, respectively. Covariates con-
tained in X
i are tax rates
9 as well as dummy variables indicating changes in the tax 
code for respective tax i (Appendix B). The lag- and lead-operator, i.e., the summa-
tion of first order differences  ∆  for different forward and backward shifts of Y (as 
well as of P and E), is employed to adjust for problems of endogeneity and autocorre-
lation. Length j (s) of this operator is chosen by means of the Schwarz-Bayesian in-
formation criterion (BIC), where we allow for a maximum length j = 3 (s = 3)  except 
for series of less than 50 observations, for which the maximum length is set to one. In 
equation (2), R denotes revenues from commodities, P the commodity price in US 
Dollars, and E the respective exchange rate. Long-run elasticities of revenues from tax 
i are given by estimates of β1
i
 – long-run elasticities of commodity revenues by esti-
mates of β1. Errors η
i and v are assumed to represent i.i.d. normal random shocks.   11 
Two short-term effects can occur in each period: Revenues may react to changes 
in real GDP (or, in case of commodity revenues, to commodity prices) and/or may 
adjust towards their long-term equilibrium level, based on the assumption that a dis-
equilibrium (ε ) exists at the beginning of a period, where 
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These effects can be considered in terms of an error correction model (ECM) 
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where (dummy-type) covariate expressions have been dropped for reasons of nota-
tional convenience; although not shown, they are included above and in the following; 
minor letters denote variables in natural log; 
i
t ∈  and  t ∈  represent i.i.d. random vari-
ables. Coefficients θ1
i
 and θ1  indicate intra-period effects, i.e., short-term adjustment 
effects to changes in real GDP and commodity prices, respectively. Thus, they can be 
interpreted as measures of short-run elasticities. A major concern of our study is to 
unravel differences between short-term and long-term effects of GDP (and commod-
ity prices) on revenues. The selected econometric specification allows a direct com-
parison of both effects. The short-term reaction of revenues to income (or, in case of 
commodity revenues, to commodity prices) is smaller or larger than the long-term re-
action, depending on whether the respective  1 θ  is smaller or larger than the respective 
1 β . A further interesting question is how fast revenues move to their (new) long-run 
equilibrium, which may result due to the changes in real GDP (or, in case of commod-
ity revenues, in commodity prices). Coefficients 
i
2 θ ,  3 θ  assess the speed of adjust-
ment of revenues towards their long-term level, i.e., the proportion of disequilibrium, 
which is reduced in each period. Thus, the larger the absolute value of 
i
2 θ  (in case of 
commodity revenues,  3 θ ) is, the faster revenues equilibrate to the new conditions and 
move to their long-term equilibrium level, respectively. 
In  equations  (5)  and  (6)  the  short-run  elasticity  of  revenues  with  respect  to 
changes in real GDP (in commodity prices) is the same regardless of whether reve-
nues are above ( 0 > t ε ) or below ( 0 < t ε ) their long-term equilibrium level. A sym-
metric reaction is implicitly assumed. To allow the reaction to depend on the particu-
                                                                                                                                            
9 In case of PIT and CIT showing progressive structure, only maximum rates are considered.   12 
lar  state  of  the  business  cycle,  the  ECM  can  be  modified  to  account  for  possible 
asymmetries 
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( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t ε D ε θ e θ p D p θ θ R υ λ λ + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − 1 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 0 ln  ,  (8) 
where the  υ  vectors represent i.i.d. random variables, and D denote dummy 
variables, which indicate the respective position of revenues relative to their long-run 
equilibrium. These dummies will take on a zero value if revenues are below their 
steady state level and a value of one else.  
 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
Figure 5 summarizes our long-run and short-run elasticity estimates of aggregate IT 
and VAT series in the region. The first row of maps visualizes our IT elasticity esti-
mates for the long run and short run, respectively. The second row of maps does so 
for VAT elasticity estimates. The size of bars in the first column of maps visualizes 
the size of estimated long-run elasticities, which typically is larger than the corre-
sponding elasticity estimates in the short run when revenues are below their long-run 
equilibrium level and smaller when above it (second column of maps). The latter are 
represented by a pair of bars, where the size of bars is identical for symmetric elastic-
ity estimates (eq. 5 and 6) and differs for statistically significant asymmetric elasticity 
estimates (eq. 7 and 8). The smaller the bars are, the less volatility is implied. The 
shading of the bars displays the adjustment speed to the new long-run equilibrium in 
case of a short-run deviation from long-run equilibrium as measured by 
i
2 λ  and  3 λ  in 
the above specifications. The darker the shading, the faster this re-adjustment takes 
place. 
For our IT short-run elasticities six out of ten estimates are estimated as clearly 
asymmetric, while four out of ten show symmetry over the business cycle. In the case 
of VAT elasticity estimates, four out of ten are symmetric, two out of ten show some 
weak asymmetry, and another four are characterized by a clear-cut asymmetry. To 
highlight the strength of our single equation approach, let us consider the results coun-
try by country. The first thing to note is that we cannot estimate all four elasticities for 
Uruguay and Ecuador. Thus, we have to abstract from these economies in the detailed 
interpretation of our results, implying concrete policy recommendations. A second 
remarkable finding is that only Mexican IT revenues react stronger when below their 
long-run equilibrium. For all other statistically significant asymmetric elasticity esti-
mates the opposite applies, that is, revenues are found to be more elastic in the short   13 
run when above their long-run equilibrium level. Corresponding exact figures of our 
elasticity estimates can be found in Table 1. 
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Notes:  Own  estimates  in  absolute  values;  for  detailed  figures  see  Table  1;  for  data  sources  and  detail  on  time  series  see 
Appendix A. 
 
Size of bars corresponds to size of elasticity estimates (according to scale shown in lower left corner); shading of bars for short-
run elasticity estimates reflects adjustment speed to long-run equilibrium: the darker the shading, the faster the adjustment. 
 
Overall, the Mexican economy has clearly more growth potential in VAT than in IT 
revenues. Obviously, revenues from VAT also adjust faster in the short run. However,   14 
there is some danger of “overheating” as Mexican VAT revenues are more susceptible 
to contractions when above their long-run equilibrium level. The opposite holds for 
Mexican IT revenues in the short run. Argentina and the Dominican Republic show a 
higher growth potential in IT compared to VAT revenues. But this advantage comes, 
in the case of the Dominican Republic, at the cost of IT revenues being relatively 
more prone to overheating. In the case of Venezuela, neither VAT is strictly prefer-
able to IT, nor the other way around as the growth potential is fairly high and the sus-
ceptibility to short-run fluctuations fairly low for both revenue types. Similarly on the 
bubble are Colombia and Peru, where the latter is characterized by an asymmetric 
elasticity over the short run for both VAT and IT revenues. The economies of Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Chile face a clear-cut trade-off, in the sense that tax revenues with the 
higher growth potential are found to be more volatile in the short and medium run and 
vice versus.
10 
In order to identify the most promising revenue sources more exactly, we also 
consider the disaggregate IT components, PIT and CIT, as well as domestic VAT, ex-
ternal VAT, social security contributions, and revenues from commodities. Ad hoc, 
disregarding a potential trade-off between growth and (asymmetric) volatility, we find 
that long-run elasticites for CIT revenues outweigh the ones for PIT in any case (see 
second column of sub-tables on PIT and CIT revenue elasticity estimates in Table 1). 
The  same  applies  to  VAT  components.  Estimated  long-run  elasticities  of  external 
VAT revenues throughout outweigh the corresponding ones of internal VAT reve-
nues.  For  Ecuador  the  long-run  elasticity  estimate  of  social  security  contributions 
stands out and tops the one of any other considered revenue series (see the “social se-
curity” part of Table 1). Not surprisingly, we clearly find the highest growth potential 
for the Chilean economy in its revenues from commodities. 
With the exception of Argentina, the above assessment remains untouched if we 
consider a possible trade-off between growth potential and susceptibility of revenues 
to cyclical fluctuations. For our estimates based on disaggregate revenue components, 
we find for Argentine external VAT revenues to show both the highest growth poten-
tial (corresponding long-run elasticity estimate is 3.64) but also the highest cyclical 
volatility (corresponding symmetric long-run elasticity estimate is 4.28). Against the 
background of the recent Argentine crisis of 1999-2002, when severe riots and social 
unrest  were  triggered  by  growing  recession  and  persistent  unemployment  in  late 
2001,
11 the relatively high susceptibility of external VAT revenues to macroeconomic 
                                                 
10 Note, negative values for short-run coefficients estimates suggest a countercyclical reaction of reve-
nues (cf. some of the entries in Table 1). Although not in accordance with our intuition, countercyclical 
responses are, for example, also estimated by Bruce et al. (2006) and Nichols and Tosun (2008). 
 
11 In contrast, the similar episode of political instability in the late 1980s was triggered by hyperinfla-
tion hitting the Argentine private sector.   15 
downturns and busts may suggest to extend and rather count on CIT and/or PIT as 
primary – and in the short run more stable – source of revenues.  
 
Table 1. Long-Run and Short-Run Revenue Elasticity: Detailed Estimates 
           
  LR Elasticity  SR Elasticity  Adjustment Speed 

































***  0.990  0.990  -0.996
***  -0.996
*** 
Dominican Rep.  2.869

















































































Dominican Rep.  2.150





***  -1.371  3.322
**  -0.091  -0.837
*** 
Uruguay  2.907
***  0.087  0.087  -1.183
***  -1.183
*** 
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Table 1 (cont'ed) 
           
  LR Elasticity  SR Elasticity  Adjustment Speed 











































Social Security                
Argentina  0.170  0.568  1.876
***  -0.048  -0.048 
Brazil  1.718
























***  1.059  -0.963
***  -0.963
*** 







Bolivia  -0.026  -0.539



































Notes: SR, LR denote short-run and long-run, respectively; 
*, 
**, 
*** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1% level. 
 
LR elasticity estimates: IT components: due to missing information no legislative changes controlled for Ecuador and Venezuela; 
VAT components: due to missing information no legislative controls for Venezuela, for Brazil no rate changes included (state 
tax) as control, no estimation for Ecuador due to lack of cointegration; Social security contributions: due to missing information 
no legislative controls for Ecuador, no estimation for Uruguay due to lack of cointegration; Revenues from commodities: due to 
missing information (or too many changes to control for) no legislative controls for Ecuador, Venezuela (and Argentina); 
 
SR elasticity estimates: For above-equilibrium coefficients the tested hypothesis is the joint hypothesis of the sum of below-
equilibrium coefficient and difference equaling zero; shortfall of controls applies analogously to LR elasticity estimates. 
 
 
Argentine PIT revenues, for example, clearly show a lower growth potential but are at 
the same time less prone to economic fluctuations than are revenues from external 
VAT. The latter, however, adjust about twice as fast back to the long-run equilibrium 
path as do the former. Hence, seen from an incumbent government the possibly exis-
tential business cycle stability of revenues comes at a cost. 
For similar reasons, considering the Brazilian crisis of 1992 that ended with the 
demise of the president, a focus on revenues from VAT rather income taxes seems to 
be the more reasonable as the more cautious strategy. As noted earlier (see footnote 
2), both, Argentina and Brazil, have in contrast to other Latin American economies 
nearly caught up with the OECD average tax collection. Today both governments col-  17 
lect taxes amounting to about one third of GDP, suggesting a lower weight on growth 




The years before the economic and financial crisis of 2008 the perennially boom-bust 
cycle susceptible Latin American economies witnessed for the first time a short period 
of excess (tax) revenues. This period came to a sudden end in 2008. Decreasing reve-
nues led to cuts in public services and social programs. They implied a falling back on 
external financing, a narrowed scope for discretionary policies, and problems of sol-
vency in some of the countries of the region. Our study by using latest econometric 
techniques tried to give some orientation for what Tanzi and Zee (2000) called “the 
art of the possible rather than the pursuit of the optimal,” that is, for the creation of 
growing and at the same time stable tax revenues in the Latin American economies. 
We find that about half of the analyzed economies face a clear-cut trade-off between 
growth and volatility of revenues. In more than half of the cases, we find revenues to 
react  asymmetrically  to  macroeconomic  conditions  in  the  short  and  medium  run: 
Above their long-run equilibrium level they react stronger to economic fluctuations. 
Below it, they react weaker. Given enough scope with regard to solvency, this finding 
is suggestive for counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy as a minor stimulus in a 
phase of above average macro-conditions might be already quite efficient in stabiliz-




Acquaah, M. and A. M. G. Gelardi (2008), The Growth and Stability of Revenues in British 
Columbia, Canada, Journal of Business and Economic Studies 14, 39-59. 
 
Antelo, E. (2003), El Balance Fiscal Estructural Ciclicamente Ajustado, mimeo, Asistencia 
Técnica Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), Caracas, Venezuela 
 
Bahl, R. W. and R. M. Bird (2008), Tax Policy in Developing Countries: Looking Back -- and 
Forward, National Tax Journal 61, 279-301. 
 
Basso,  M.  A.  (2006),  El  Balance  Estructural:  Metodología  y  Estimación  para  Argentina,  
mimeo, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, Buenos Aires 
 
Bruce, D., Fox, W. F., and M. H. Tuttle (2006), Tax Base Elasticities: A Multi-State Analysis 
of Long-Run and Short-Run Dynamics, Southern Economic Journal 73, 315–341. 
 
Cárdenas, Ó.,  Ventosa-Santaulària, D.,  and M.  Gómez  (2008),  Elasticidad  Ingreso  de  los 
Impuestos Federales en México: Efectos en la Recaudación Federal Participable, El 
Trimestre Económico 75, 519–531.   18 
 
Cashin, P., Liang, H., and C. J. McDermott (2000), How Persistent are Shocks to World 
Commodity Prices?, IMF Staff Papers 47, 177–217. 
 
Catão, L. A. V. (2007), Backcasting Latin America, Finance & Development 44, 39-43. 
 
De Mello, L. and D. Moccero (2006), Brazil’s Fiscal Stance during 1995-2004: The Effect of 
Indebtedness on Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle, OECD Economics Depart-
ment Working Paper No. 485 
 
Dye, R. F. (2004), State Revenue Cyclicality, National Tax Journal 57, 133–146. 
 
Dye, R. F. and T. J. McGuire (1991), Growth and Variability of State Individual Income and 
General Sales Taxes, National Tax Journal 44, 55-66. 
 
ECLAC (2008), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2007-2008, Santiago 
de Chile: United Nations Publication 
 
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger (1987), Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representa-
tion, Estimation, and Testing, Econometrica 55, 251–276. 
 
Fanelli, J. M. (2009), Volatilidad, Ciclo y Política Fiscal en América Latina, EUROsociAL 
Fiscalidad, Madrid 
 
Felix, R. A. (2008), The Growth and Volatility of State Tax Revenue Sources in the Tenth 
District, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 3rd Quarter, 63–88. 
 
Fox, W. F. and C. Campbell (1984), Stability of the State Sales Tax Income Elasticities, 
National Tax Journal 37, 201-212. 
 
Fuentes, J. and M. Tobar Silva (2004), La Política Fiscal como Herramienta de Ajuste Cíclico 
en El Salvador, Documento de Trabajo Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, No. 
2004-1 
 
Groves, H. M. and C. H. Kahn (1952), The Stability of State and Local Tax Yields, American 
Economic Review 42, 87-102. 
 
Jiménez, J. P. and V. Tromben (2006), Fiscal Policy and the Commodities Boom: The Impact 
of Higher Prices for Non-Renewables in Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL 
Review 90, 59-84. 
 
Labys, W. C. (2006), Modeling and Forecasting Primary Commodity Prices, Ashgate Pub-
lishing, Hampshire 
 
Legler, J. B. and P. Shapiro (1968), The Responsiveness of State Tax Revenue to Economic 
Growth, National Tax Journal 21, 46-57. 
 
Maddala, G. S. and S. Wu (1999), A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data 
and a Simple New Test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics  61, 631-652. 
 
Nichols, M. W. and M. S. Tosun (2008), The Income Elasticity of Gross Casino Revenues: 
Short-Run and Long-Run Estimates, National Tax Journal 61, 635-652. 
 
Rincón,  H.,  Berthel,  J.,  and  M.  Gómez  (2003),  Balance  Fiscal  Estructural  y  Cíclico  del 
Gobierno  Nacional  Central  de  Colombia,  1980-2002,  Banco  de  la  Republica  de   19 
Colombia Borradores de Economía No. 246 
 
Salazar, N. and D. Prada (2003), El Balance Estructural del Gobierno Central en Colombia, 
República  de  Colombia  Departamento  Nacional  de  Planeación  Archivos  de  Eco-
nomía No. 226. 
 
Schenone, O. H. and C. De la Torre (2005), Guatemala: Fortalecimiento de la Estructura 
Tributaria,  in  M. R. Agosin, Barreix,  A.,  and R.  Machado  (eds.),  Recaudar  para 
crecer: Bases para la reforma tributaria en Centroamérica, Interamerican Develo-
pment Bank, Washington, D.C., 157-190. 
 
Sobel, R. S. and R. G. Holcombe (1996), Measuring the Growth and Variability of Tax Bases 
over the Business Cycle, National Tax Journal 49, 535-552. 
 
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (1993), A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in 
Higher Order Integrated Systems, Econometrica 61, 783-820. 
 
Tanzi, V. and H. H. Zee (2000), Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries, 
National Tax Journal 53, 299-322. 
 
Tapia, H. (2003), Balance Estructural del Gobierno Central de Chile: Análisis y Propuestas, 
ECLAC Macroeconomía del Desarrollo No. 25 
 
White, F. C. (1983), Trade-Off in Growth and Stability in State Taxes, National Tax Journal 
36, 103-114. 
 
Wilford, W. T. (1965), State Tax Stability Criteria and the Revenue-Income Elasticity Coeffi-
cient Reconsidered, National Tax Journal 18, 304-312. 
 
Williams, V., Anderson, R. M., Froehle, D. O., and K. L. Lamb (1973), The Stability, Growth 
and Stabilizing Influence of State Taxes, National Tax Journal 26, 267-274. 
 
Wolswijk, G. (2009), The Short- and Long-Run Tax Revenue Response to Changes in Tax 
Bases, Economics Bulletin 29, 1960-1970.   20 
Appendix A: Data Detail and Sources 
[Table is continued on the following 6 pages.] 
 
Argentina    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas, Administración Federal de 
Ingresos Públicos 
Notes  Includes withholding taxes 
Personal Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1997 - Q1 2009 
Source  Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos 
Notes  Does not include withholding taxes 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1997 - Q1 2009 
Source  Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos 
Notes  Does not include withholding taxes 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Domestic Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas, Administración Federal de 
Ingresos Públicos 
External Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas, Administración Federal de 
Ingresos Públicos 
Social Security    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q2 2000 - Q1 2009 
Source  Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos 
Notes  Export duties 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central de la República Argentina 
Notes   In Pesos of 1993 
Current GDP     
Source  Banco Central de la República Argentina 
Commodity Prices    
Beef, Australia & New Zealand, frozen boneless, U.S. import price FOB port of entry (¢/lb.) 
Soybeans, United States, n° 2 yellow, CIF Rotterdam 
Soybean oil, The Netherlands, FOB ex-mill 
Crude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted ($/barrel) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Notes  Price index weighted with share in total export duties 
Exchange Rate    
Source  ECLAC 
Deflator  GDP – Deflator   21 
Bolivia    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Personal Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Domestic Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
External Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas Públicas 
Notes  Includes special tax on hydrocarbons, direct tax on hydrocarbons and 
utility tax on mining industry 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central de Bolivia 
Notes  In Bolivianos of 1990 
Current GDP    
Source  Banco Central de Bolivia 
Commodity Price    
Russian Natural Gas, in Germany U.S. Dollars per Thousand Cubic Meters (FMI) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Exchange Rate    
Source  ECLAC 
Deflator  GDP – Deflator 
   
Brazil    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1994 - Q1 2009 
Source  Tesouro Nacional 
Notes  Witholding taxes are included 
Personal Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1994 - Q1 2009 
Source  Tesouro Nacional 
Notes  Witholding taxes are excluded 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1994 - Q1 2009 
Source  Tesouro Nacional 
Notes  Witholding taxes are excluded 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Receita Federal   22 
Notes  State tax 
Social Security    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Tesouro Nacional 
Real GDP     
Source  Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
Notes  Index 1995=100 
Deflator  Consumer Price Index  
Source  ECLAC 
Notes   Dec1993=100 
Chile    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Includes CIT from the private mining sector, net values 
Personal Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Gross values 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Includes CIT from the private mining sector, gross values 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Net values 
Domestic Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Gross values 
External Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Gross values 
Social Security    
Period  Q1 1990 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Servicio de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Specific tax and provisional payments of income tax and net transfers from 
CODELCO, does not include CIT from private mining sector 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central de Chile 
Notes  In Pesos of 2003 
Current GDP     
Source  Banco Central de Chile 
Commodity Price    
Copper, wire bars, U.S. producer, FOB refinery (¢/lb.) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Exchange Rate    
Source  ECLAC   23 
Deflator  GDP – Deflator 
Colombia    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1998 - Q4 2008 
Source  Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal 
Notes  Includes CIT from the mining sector 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q4 2008 
Source  Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal 
Domestic Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q4 2008 
Source  Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal 
External Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q4 2008 
Source  Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco de la República Colombia 
Notes  In Pesos of 2000, already deseasonalized, linked series 
Deflator  Consumer Price Index 
Source  ECLAC 
Notes   Dec2008=100 
Dominican Republic    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1992 - Q1 2009 
Source  Banco Central de la República Dominicana 
Personal Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1997 - Q1 2009 
Source  Dirrección General de Impuestos Internos 
Notes  Shortfall in time series  does not allow application of econometric model 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1997 - Q1 2009 
Source  Dirrección General de Impuestos Internos 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1992 - Q1 2009 
Source  Banco Central de la República Dominicana 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central de la República Dominicana 
Notes  In Dominican Republic Dollars of 1991 
Current GDP    
Source  Banco Central de la República Dominicana 
Deflator  GDP – Deflator 
Ecuador    
Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1994 - Q1 2009 
Source  Dirección General Adjunta de Estadística de la Hacienda Pública 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1994 - Q1 2009 
Source  Dirección General Adjunta de Estadística de la Hacienda Pública 
Social Security    
Period  Q1 1996 - Q1 2009 
Source  Dirección General Adjunta de Estadística de la Hacienda Pública   24 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q1 1994 - Q1 2009 
Source  Dirección General Adjunta de Estadística de la Hacienda Pública 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central del Ecuador 
Notes  In U.S. Dollars of 2000 
Commodity Price    
Crude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted ($/barrel) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Exchange Rate    
Source  ECLAC 
Deflator  Consumer Price Index 
Source  ECLAC 
Notes  2004=100 
Mexico    
Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Secretaría de Hacienda y de Crédito Público 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Secretaría de Hacienda y de Crédito Público 
Social Security    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Secretaría de Hacienda y de Crédito Público 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Secretaría de Hacienda y de Crédito Público 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco de México 
Notes  In Pesos of 2003, linked series 
Commodity Price    
Crude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted ($/barrel) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Exchange Rate   
Source  ECLAC 
Deflator   Consumer Price Index  
Source  ECLAC 
Notes  2nd fortnight Jun2002 = 100 
Peru    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Gross values 
Personal Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Gross values 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Gross values   25 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Gross values 
Domestic Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Gross values 
External Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Gross values 
Social Security    
Period  Q3 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Supportive contributions for pension plans are not included 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q1 1998 - Q1 2009 
Source  Superintedencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria 
Notes  Includes CIT on the mining and hydrocarbon sectors and transfer from the 
mining sector, gross values 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central de Reserva del Perú 
Notes  In Nuevos Soles of 1994 
Current GDP    
Source  Banco Central de Reserva del Perú 
Commodity Prices    
Copper, wire bars, U.S. producer, FOB refinery (¢/lb.) 
Zinc, special high grade, LME, cash settlement 
Gold, 99.5% fine, afternoon fixing London ($/troy ounce) 
Crude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted ($/barrel) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Notes   Price index weighted with share in total exports 
Exchange Rate    
Source  ECLAC 
Deflator  GDP – Deflator 
Uruguay    
Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas 
Personal Income Tax    
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas 
Notes  Not used (as implemented not before 2007, replacing various taxes) 
Corporate Income Tax    
Period  Q1 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas 
Notes  Does not include tax on social security contribution  
Domestic Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas   26 
External Value Added Tax    
Period  Q1 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas 
Social Security    
Period  Q1 1999 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio de Economía y de Finanzas 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central del Uruguay 
Notes  In Pesos of 2005 
Current GDP    
Source  Banco Central del Uruguay 
Deflator  GDP - Deflator 
Venezuela    
Income Tax   
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio del Poder Popular de Planificación y de Finanzas 
Value Added Tax    
Period  Q4 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio del Poder Popular de Planificación y de Finanzas 
Revenue from Commodities    
Period  Q1 1993 - Q1 2009 
Source  Ministerio del Poder Popular de Planificación y de Finanzas 
Real GDP     
Source  Banco Central de Venezuela 
Notes  In Bolívares of 1997, linked series 
Commodity Price    
Crude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted ($/barrel) 
Source  IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Exchange Rate    
Source  ECLAC 
Deflator  Consumer Price Index 
Source  ECLAC 
Notes   Dec2007=100 27 
 
Appendix B: Controls for exogenous changes in tax schedules, commodity sectors, 
and in social security systems 
Table B.1 
 
  LR Elasticities (LR-E)  Symmetric SR-E  Asymmetric SR-E 
Argentina                   
IT  Law 26287  Q2 07 - Q1 09            
   Decree 1426/08  Q1 08 - Q1 09             
PIT        Law 25239  Q1 00  Law 25239  Q1 00 
CIT  Decree 1426/08  Q1 08 - Q1 09             
VAT  Law 20631  Q4 97 - Q1 09             
  Decree 493/01  Q3 01 - Q1 09            
  Law 25710, 
25717 
Q1 03 - Q1 09            
   Law 26346  Q1 08 - Q1 09             
Domestic VAT  Decree 493/01  Q3 01 - Q1 09             
External VAT  Law 20631  Q4 97 - Q1 09        Law 25710, 
25717 
Q1 03 
  Decree 493/01  Q3 01 - Q1 09            
  Law 25710, 
25717 
Q1 03 - Q1 09            
   Law 26346  Q1 08 - Q1 09             
Social Security  Law 25453, 
Decree 1009/01 
Q3 01 - Q1 09             
  General Resolu-
tion 1750/04 
Q4 04 - Q1 09             
  Decree 1346/07, 
General Resolu-
tion 2055/07 
Q4 07 - Q1 09            
  Decree 279/08, 
General Resolu-
tion 2431, 08 
Q2 08 - Q1 09            
Bolivia                   
IT  Law 1606  Q1 95 - Q1 09        Law 2493, 2196  Q3 01  
  Law 2493, 2196  Q3 01 - Q1 09            
PIT  Law 2493, 2196  Q3 01 - Q1 09  Law 2493, 2196  Q3 01   Law 2493, 2196  Q3 01  
CIT  Law 1606  Q1 95 - Q1 09  Law 1606  Q1 95  Law 1606  Q1 95 
VAT        Law 1606  Q1 95  Law 1606  Q1 95 
Domestic VAT  Law 2064  Q3 00 - Q1 09  Law 1606  Q1 95  Law 1606  Q1 95 
External VAT  Law 2064  Q3 00 - Q1 09  Law 1606  Q1 95  Law 1606  Q1 95 
         Law 2064  Q3 00       
Commodities  Law 1606  Q1 95 - Q1 09  Law 1981  Q1 00  Law 1981  Q1 00 
  Law 1981  Q1 00 - Q1 09        Law 3058  Q2 05 
  Law 3058  Q2 05 - Q1 09            
 
Note:  SR, LR denote short-run and long-run, respectively; Q1,…, Q4 denote first to fourth quarter, respectively; 
 
a) D.O.F. denotes Diario Oficial de la Federacion 
 
[Table is continued on the following 3 pages.] 
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[continued]  LR-E  Symmetric SR-E  Asymmetric SR-E 
Brazil                   
IT   Law 8981/95  Q1 95 - Q1 09  Law 9249/95, 
9778/98 
Q1 98   Law 9249/95, 
9778/98 
Q1 98  
   Law 9249/95, 
9778/98 
Q1 98 - Q1 09             
CIT  Law 8981/95  Q1 95 - Q1 09             
Social Security  Provisional 
Measure 413/08 
Q3 08 - Q1 09             
Chile                   
IT  Law 20170  Q1 07 - Q1 09             
PIT  Law 19506  Q4 97 - Q1 09        Law 20255  Q1 09 
   Law 19578  Q3 05 - Q1 09             
CIT  Law 19506  Q4 97 - Q1 09             
   Law 20170  Q1 07 - Q1 09             
VAT  Law 19398  Q4 95 - Q1 09             
  Law 19633  Q4 94 - Q1 09            
  Law 19738  Q1 02 - Q1 09            
  Law 19888  Q4 03 - Q1 09            
   Law 20190  Q2 07 - Q1 09             
Domestic VAT  Law 19738  Q1 02 - Q1 09  Law 19888  Q4 03  Law 19888  Q4 03 
External VAT  Law 19738  Q1 02 - Q1 09             
  Law 20190  Q2 07 - Q1 09            
Colombia                   
IT  Law 488  Q1 01 - Q4 08            
   Law 863  Q1 04 - Q4 08             
VAT  Law 488  Q1 01 - Q4 08             
   Law 1111  Q1 07 - Q4 08             
Domestic VAT  Law 488  Q1 01 - Q4 08             
External VAT  Law 488  Q1 01 - Q4 08        Law 1111  Q1 07 
  Law 1111  Q1 07 - Q4 08            
Dominican Republic                
IT  Law 288-04  Q4 04 - Q1 09              
VAT  Law 147-00  Q1 01 - Q1 09  Law 11-92   Q3 09  Law 11-92   Q3 09 
  Law 557-05  Q1 06 - Q1 09        Law 557-05  Q1 06 
  Law 495-06  Q1 07 - Q1 09            
   Law 172-07  Q4 07 - Q1 09             




1Q 02 - Q1 09              




1Q 06 - Q1 09             
VAT  D.O.F. 28-12-
1994 
1Q 95 - Q1 09  D.O.F. 28-12-
1994 
1Q 95  D.O.F. 30-12-
2002 
1Q 03 
   D.O.F. 30-12-
2002 
1Q 03 - Q1 09  D.O.F. 30-12-
2002 
1Q 03       29 
 
 [continued]  LR-E  Symmetric SR-E  Asymmetric SR-E 
Social Security  D.O.F. 21-12-
1995 
1Q 95 - Q1 09  D.O.F. 21-12-
1995 
1Q 95  D.O.F. 20-12-
2001 
1Q 03 
   D.O.F. 20-12-
2001 
1Q 03 - Q1 09   D.O.F. 20-12-
2001 
1Q 03       
Commodities  D.O.F. 21-12-
2005 
1Q 06 - Q1 09             
Peru                   
IT  Law 27356  Q1 01 - Q1 09  Law 27356  Q1 01  Law 27356  Q1 01 
  Law 27804  Q1 03 - Q1 09  Law 27804  Q1 03  Law 27804  Q1 03 
  Legislative De-
cree 945 
Q1 04 - Q1 09  Law 28655  Q1 06      
   Law 28655  Q1 06 - Q1 09             
PIT  Law 27356  Q1 01 - Q1 09  Law 27356  Q1 01  Law 27356  Q1 01 
  Law 27804  Q1 03 - Q1 09  Law 27804  Q1 03  Law 27804  Q1 03 
   Legislative De-
cree 945 
Q1 04 - Q1 09             
CIT  Law 27356  Q1 01 - Q1 09  Law 27356  Q1 01  Law 27356  Q1 01 
  Law 27804  Q1 03 - Q1 09  Law 27804  Q1 03      
  Legislative De-
cree 945 
Q1 04 - Q1 09  Law 28655  Q1 06      
   Law 28655  Q1 06 - Q1 09             
VAT        Supreme Decree 
024-2004, Legis-
lative Decree 950 
Q2 04       
Domestic VAT        Supreme Decree 
024-2004, Legis-
lative Decree 950 
Q2 04       




Q2 04 - Q1 09  Supreme Decree 
024-2004, Legis-
lative Decree 950 
Q2 04       
Commodities  Law 27356  Q1 01 - Q1 09  Law 27804  Q1 03  Law 27804  Q1 03 
  Law 27804  Q1 03 - Q1 09            
  Legislative De-
cree 945 
Q1 04 - Q1 09            
  Law 28258  Q2 05 - Q1 09            
Uruguay                   
IT  Law 17453  Q2 02 - Q2 07            
   Law 18083  Q3 07 - Q1 09             
CIT  Law 17453  Q2 02 - Q2 07             
VAT  Law 17296  Q2 01 - Q1 09             
  Law 17453, 
17503 
Q2 02 - Q1 09            
  Law 17615, 
17651 
Q2 03 - Q1 09            
  Law 18083  Q3 07 - Q1 09            
   Law 18341  Q2 08 - Q1 09             30 
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Domestic VAT  Law 17453, 
17503 
Q2 02 - Q1 09  Law 17453, 
17503 
Q2 02       
   Law 18341  Q2 08 - Q1 09             
External VAT  Law 17296  Q2 01 - Q1 09             
  Law 17615, 
17651 
Q2 03 - Q1 09            
   Law 18083  Q3 07 - Q1 09             
 